Occupational licensing has grown dramatically in recent years, with over 25% of the U.S. workforce having attained a license as of 2008, up from 5% in 1950. The associated debate as to whether licensing improves quality or is simply rent-seeking behavior has correspondingly grown in intensity. Exploiting a staffing provision of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, we estimate the impact of increased licensure of social workers in skilled nursing facilities on quality. The key provision requires all skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) with 121 or more beds to provide at least one full-time equivalent qualified social worker. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that this provision binds at that margin for a significant share of SNFs. Qualified social worker staffing increases by 8-10%. However, the overall increase in social service staffing is negligible because firms tend to meet this requirement in the lowest cost way -substituting from unlicensed, paraprofessional social service staff to qualified social workers, effectively increasing the licensure level of the marginal social service staff. We find no evidence that the upgrade in social service staffing improves overall SNF quality, quality of life, or provision of social services, as measured by the deficiency scores received by a facility during their annual recertification inspection.
Introduction
Occupational licensing has grown dramatically in recent years, with over 25% of the US workforce having attained a license as of , up from 5% in 1950 (Kleiner and Krueger 2010 Kleiner and Krueger 2013) . A growing consensus from empirical work suggests that licensing increases prices and the wages of licensed workers substantially, likely through restricting supply (Shepherd, 1978; Cox and Foster, 1990; Kleiner and Krueger, 2010; Gittleman and Kleiner, 2016) . However, the impact of occupational licensing on the quality of the service provided is less clear. 1 The practice has historically been justified under the belief that additional training and/or requirements to pass a formal exam should truncate the lower tail of the quality distribution, raising the quality of those who remain. Additionally, workers may invest more in human capital when protected from low-cost substitutes (Kleiner, 2000) .
However, theory suggests forces that could counteract any quality improvements. For example, if licensees are subject to less competitive pressure, their incentives to provide high-quality service may be diminished.
Recent empirical studies have yet to come to a consensus on the quality implications of occupational licensing. Given the breadth of occupations covered by occupational licenses, and the heterogeneity in the stringency of licensing, what is true in any single occupation may not be true in others. Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) find that increased stringency in the licensing of dentists does not lead to an improvement in the dental outcomes of patients. 2 In contrast, Anderson et al. (2016) find that requiring midwives to be licensed in the early 1900s reduced maternal mortality substantially and reduced mortality of young children from diarrhea. While these are just two high profile examples, they illustrate the range of findings.
We contribute to the growing literature by estimating the impact of occupational licensing on quality, focusing on the staffing of social service departments in skilled nursing facilities (SNFs). 3 Unlicensed paraprofessionals and qualified social workers provide the same services in social service departments, but a staffing provision of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA-87) requires all SNFs with 121 or more beds to staff at least one full-time equivalent (FTE) qualified social worker. Qualified social workers (QSWs) must be licensed to practice in the state the facility is located in, or if the state does not have its own licensing requirements, the federal government requires QSWs to meet educational and experience requirements similar to state licensing requirements. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that this provision binds at that margin for a significant share of SNFs. QSW staffing increases by 8-10%. However, the overall increase in social service staffing is negligible because firms tend to meet this requirement in the lowest cost way -substituting from unlicensed paraprofessional social service staff to QSWs, effectively increasing the licensure level of the marginal social service employee. This policy creates a natural experiment whereby SNFs just above the threshold are induced to use a significantly higher share of QSWs relative to their counterparts at slightly smaller facilities.
Our study is different from existing studies on occupational licensing and quality in two important ways. First, existing studies exploit differences in licensing requirements across states (Kleiner and Kudrle, 2000; Anderson et al., 2016) . Estimated effects could be biased by sorting of individuals into areas that are more or less regulated. 4 In contrast, the policy requirement we focus on leads to variation in licensure within a geographic region at a given point in time, based on facility size. Second, our study focuses on firms substituting between two possible inputs on the margin: a licensed employee or a nonlicensed employee performing similar duties. In other words, we estimate the quality impact of requiring the marginal employee to be licensed. This local average treatment effect is the appropriate measure for policy changes that seek to extend licensure in a particular field, which could be different than the average effect of licensing the entire field.
We find that the OBRA-87 social service staffing provision led to about a six percentage point increase in the share of social service hours that are staffed by QSWs. Importantly, we find no evidence of changes in any other type of staffing levels (e.g. nurses) or facility characteristics (e.g. for-profit vs.
non-profit) at the threshold, suggesting that the only discontinuous change is in the licensure composition of social service departments. Using the same regression discontinuity design with outcomes on quality, we find no evidence of a corresponding change in overall SNF quality or provision of social services, as measured by the deficiency score received by a facility during their annual recertification inspection.
There is tepid evidence that increased licensure improves deficiency scores in the narrow category of admission, transfer, and discharge rights.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the OBRA-87 social service staffing provision. Section 3 describes the data, while section 4 outlines our empirical framework. Section 5 presents the results of our analysis, including falsification tests. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the implications of our findings.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 and Social Services in SNFs
During the 1980s, there was significant concern that SNFs were understaffed and were not adequately providing care to residents. At the request of Congress, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) conducted a study of the industry and published a report that found that residents of SNFs were abused, neglected, and given inadequate care (IOM, 1986) . As part of OBRA-87, Congress required major reforms to how the federal government regulated SNFs. These reforms required the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to establish federal regulatory standards that all SNFs that receive Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement are required to meet, and to create an inspection process that assured SNFs met those standards (GAO, 2007; CMS, 2015) . While these standards have evolved over time to reflect changes in the industry, standards encompassed aspects of quality of care, quality of life, resident rights, and staffing requirements.
One area that CMS identified to address in federal standards is the provision of social services.
Recognizing that resident outcomes and quality of care are often tied to quality of life and resident dignity, under federal regulation §483.15(g)(1), all SNFs are required to "provide medically-related social services to attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being of each resident." Effectively, this standard requires SNFs to provide social services that help residents cope and adjust to living with their underlying health conditions. Further, staff providing social services should be in contact with the resident and anyone the resident designates regarding care planning, discharge planning, care goals, need for special assistance, and counseling services. This implies that social service staff directly help residents with multiple aspects of SNF care, including aspects that are associated with a resident's quality of life and care, as well as discharge planning.
While federal regulations clearly require SNFs to provide social services, they do not specify the minimum qualifications or level of social service staffing required. Instead, interpretative guidelines of federal standards state that "It is not required that a qualified social worker necessarily provide all of these services. Rather, it is the responsibility of the facility to identify the medically-related social service needs of the resident and assure that the needs are met by the appropriate disciplines." (CMS, 2016b, p. 121) .
Thus, facilities are largely able to choose the amount and type of social service staff they employ in their social service departments. One exception to the autonomy of SNFs is federal regulation §483.15(g)(2), which states that "A facility with more than 120 beds must employ a qualified social worker on a fulltime basis." Thus, SNFs with 120 beds or fewer face no specific guidelines on the type or level of social service staffing they provide. SNFs with more than 120 beds must have at least one FTE qualified social worker (QSW). This discrete change in staffing requirements at an arbitrary threshold of facility size is the motivation for our regression discontinuity design.
A QSW is a type of social service staff that must be licensed to practice in the state the facility is To estimate the impact of the OBRA-87 social service staffing provision on a range of outcomes, we use standard methods for regression discontinuity analysis (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008) . First, we restrict the data to a narrow bandwidth surrounding the 121-bed threshold-at which SNFs must provide at least one full-time equivalent QSW. Based on the mean squared error optimal bandwidth selection procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2014) , we use bandwidths of 10, 20, and 30 beds. 8 Our preferred specification uses a uniform kernel, as Imbens and Lemieux (2008) argue that differences when using more complex weighting schemes are primarily indicative of sensitivity to bandwidth choice. Within our bandwidth, we estimate the following model:
where is a measure of social service staffing, deficiency scores, or a set of placebo outcomes.
121 is an indicator equal to one if facility i, in time period t, has at least 121 beds. The running variable is , which is the number of beds in facility centered at the 121-bed threshold. For example, a bandwidth of 30 would put weight on all facilities with 91-150 beds (30 below the threshold, 91-120, and 30 above the threshold, 121-150). We allow for different polynomials in facility size, and for a different fit on either side of the threshold. Finally, are state fixed effects to account for differences in regulations across states. In robustness checks we demonstrate the core results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables (see Appendix Tables A2 and A3 ).
The coefficient of interest, β1, is the effect of the OBRA-87 social service staffing provision on the outcome being considered. Under the identifying assumption that other determinants of quality are continuous at the 121-bed threshold, β1 will be an unbiased estimate of the effect of the staffing provision.
Standard errors are clustered at the facility level, which accounts for the fact that the same facility is observed in different time periods. 
Results
Results are divided into three subsections. In the first subsection, we document the substantial increase in QSWs and the near corresponding decrease in unlicensed paraprofessionals that occurs at facilities with just over 120 beds. In the second subsection, we show that there is no evidence that other staffing levels or SNF characteristics vary at the 121-bed threshold. In the final subsection, we examine how facility deficiency scores change at the 121-bed threshold, with an emphasis on areas of quality most likely to relate to the social service department.
Results for Staffing of Social Service Departments
SNF social service departments are staffed with unlicensed paraprofessionals and QSWs that work as a team to provide social services to SNF residents (Roberts and Bowblis, 2017) . If federal regulatory standards are binding, we expect that SNFs just above the 121-bed threshold to have social service departments with more QSWs. Since there is evidence that total staffing levels of social service departments do not dramatically change around this threshold (Roberts and Bowblis, in press), we expect the staffing levels of paraprofessionals to decrease and the composition of social service departments to become more heavily weighted towards QSWs. If this occurs, we can then conclude that the effect of the federal standards are binding and any change in staffing is mostly due to a compositional change in social service departments toward QSWs, and not changes in staffing levels. If the OBRA-87 provision has an impact on social service staffing, this should be evident in a discrete jump at the 121-bed threshold. To make this assessment, we examine six different variables related to social service staffing. Focusing first in the top left corner, there is a clear increase in the share of facilities that employ any QSWs. The second outcome follows the federal standard and indicates whether the SNF employs at least 1 FTE QSW. Here the jump is even starker, suggesting that the OBRA-87 social service staffing provision does bite and leads to an increase in staffing of QSWs. When gauging the impact of staffing on patients, it is prudent to look at staffing per resident. To do so, we examine the level of social service staffing in terms of hours per resident day (HPRD), which theoretically captures the amount of staff time available for each resident in the facility per day. 10 We calculate three measures of social service staffing levels: QSW HPRD, paraprofessionals HPRD, and total social service staff HPRD (i.e. QSWs and paraprofessionals). Panel 3 shows that this increase in staffing is felt on a per-patient basis, with an increase in QSW HPRD. Panel 4 provides evidence that the increase in QSWs may be offset by a decrease in paraprofessional staff. The net effect on overall social service staffing, seen in Panel 5, is negligible due to this substitution of types of social service staffing. Panel 6 directly examines this substitution, using the share of total social service staff that are QSWs as the outcome. The composition of social service staff has clearly shifted towards QSWs and away from paraprofessionals. Table 1 shows the corresponding regression estimates, with the column numbers corresponding to the labels in Figure 1 . Panel A shows estimates for a narrow bandwidth of 10 beds and no controls for facility size. The implicit assumption is that the discontinuity provides a randomized experiment in a local area around the 121-bed threshold. Panels B and C use a separate linear fit for facility size on either side of the threshold and bandwidths of 20 and 30 beds respectively. The estimates are consistent with the visual evidence in Figure 1 and are fairly stable across specifications. No matter how it is measured, Columns 1 through 3 show that the staffing of QSWs increases significantly at the 121-bed threshold. In addition,
Column 4 finds that this increase in QSWs in partially offset by a decrease in paraprofessional staffingthe estimates are uniformly negative and statistically significant in some specifications. This is not surprising as paraprofessionals and QSWs overlap in skills and duties, and the federal regulation does not mandate a minimum staffing level for social service departments. Consistent with minimizing costs, the corresponding changes in QSW and paraprofessional staffing levels do not result in significant changes in the total staffing levels of social service departments (Column 5). 11 Most of the change around the 121-bed threshold is a change in social service composition -the share of social services staff comprised of QSWs increases by 5-6 percentage points (Column 6). The balance of the evidence suggests that there is a clear increase in QSWs, the majority of this increase is due to a substitution from paraprofessionals towards QSWs, and that total level of social service staffing remains largely unchanged.
To probe the robustness of the substitution from paraprofessionals to QSWs, in Table 2 we estimate specifications using different bandwidths, different polynomials in facility size, and excluding facilities with exactly 120-beds. The dependent variable in all columns is the share of social service staff that are QSWs. Columns 1 replicates the preferred specification from Table 2 , while columns 2-7 show results for bandwidths of 20, 30, 40, 50, 75 , and 100 beds with a linear polynomial in facility size. Columns 8 and 9
10 HPRD is calculated using the following formula that is standard to CASPER data: (FTE * 70) / (14 * number of residents). This formula assumes that staffing is measured over a two-week period and that a FTE works 70 hours over that two-week period (Konetzka et al., 2008; Lin, 2014) . 11 Results for two of the three bandwidths are not statistically significant and there is no apparent visual discontinuity in total social service staffing.
include a quadratic in facility size, and column 10 drops facilities with exactly 120-beds due to significant heaping at this size facility (Barreca et al., 2016) . The estimates are remarkably consistent and indicate that the OBRA-87 social service staffing provision leads to an increase of 5 to 7 percentage points in the share of social services staff that are QSWs. All estimates are significant at the 1 percent level.
Specification checks -Discontinuities in other variables
The central threat to the validity of our regression discontinuity design comes from the possibility of nonrandom sorting of facilities on either side of the cutoff. That is, facilities could strategically manipulate the number of beds to avoid federal regulations related to employing a QSW. Figure 2 shows the distribution of observations around the 121-bed threshold. Notably, there is significant heaping at 10-bed intervals, with more prominent heaps at 60-bed intervals. Conditional on not being an increment of 10, there is no sharp decrease in the number of facilities above the 121-bed threshold, which we would expect if firms were strategically avoiding the policy. To assure that this heaping is not caused by other policies, we examined federal and state policies that may cause a SNF to heap at a certain number of beds. In terms of reimbursement policy, we found some states have different formulas to determine Medicaid reimbursement rates around 100 beds, but found no differences around 120 beds.
Additionally, we found some states have different nurse staffing requirements based on the number of beds. Almost all of these pertain to the director of nursing, with some states allowing the director of nursing to be considered the charge nurse or be included in calculations of nurses devoted to direct care if 12 The difference in hourly rates for a QSW and paraprofessional is $4.06 to $5.16 using the May 2016 release of wages for SNFs by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_623100.htm). 13 The increase in HPRD of QSWs at the 121-bed threshold is approximately 0.005 HPRD (Table 1 , Column 3). We multiply this increase by 7 days and the difference in hourly wages to obtain an estimate of the difference in weekly cost of adhering to the regulation per resident. By multiplying this number 120, we then get an estimate of the weekly cost of adhering to the regulation if the facility had nearly a 100% occupancy rate. Lastly, to assure econometrically that the 121-bed threshold only affects quality through changes in social service staffing, we examine a host of facility characteristics and other types of SNF staffing that are known be correlated with quality. If all other factors affecting SNF quality, besides social worker staffing, are continuous at the 121-bed threshold, the regression discontinuity design will provide consistent estimates of the effect of the shift in social service staffing to QSWs due to federal regulations.
These facility level characteristics form placebo tests, because they should not be impacted by the OBRA-87 social service staffing provision. Figure 3 illustrates these placebo tests, while Table 3 shows the corresponding regression estimates. Panel numbers refer to the figure and column numbers refer to the table.
The first placebo outcome is indicator for for-profit ownership. SNFs are a mixed-mode industry, and for-profit SNFs are known to engage in greater profit maximizing behavior and provide lower quality than not-for-profits (Grabowski et al., 2013; Bowblis et al, 2016) . Therefore, if for-profits are more likely to be just below the 121-bed threshold, any differences in quality may be due to SNFs engaging in behavior to get around the regulatory standard. Panel 1 shows no evidence of a discontinuity in facility ownership around the threshold, and the corresponding regression estimates are not statistically significant.
Our second set of placebo outcomes focus on the type of patients within the facility. The first outcome is the facility-level activities of daily living (ADL) index score. Because the needs of residents are associated with quality, a SNF with more dependent residents is likely to have lower quality. The ADL index score measures this level of need. Results in Panel/Column 2 suggest no large differences in patient need. The next two outcomes examine the payer-mix of residents. While SNFs are required to provide the same quality to all residents regardless of payer (Grabowski et al., 2008) , Medicaid reimburses at significantly lower rates than Medicare or private payers. For this reason, Medicaid is often cross-subsidized by other payers (Troyer, 2002) , and a greater proportion of residents on Medicaid can lead to worse quality outcomes. Therefore, it is important to determine that payer-mix is not driving the results. Panels/Columns 3 and 4 reveal no evidence of differences in payer mix at the 121-bed threshold.
Overall, there does not appear to be any systematic differences in the composition of patients.
The final set of placebo outcomes are nurse staffing levels. Nurses provide direct care to residents and there is some evidence that higher nurse staffing levels improve quality. 16 We measure the level of nurse staffing in terms of HPRD for registered nurses with administrative duties (Panel/Column 5) and for all direct care nurses (Panel/Column 6). 17 Both the visual evidence and the regression results reveal no evidence of discontinuities in these nurse staffing outcomes. Collectively, the results support the identifying assumption that other determinants of facility quality are continuous at the 121-bed threshold, and the only discontinuous jump is in the share of social service staff that are QSWs.
Results for Deficiencies
Though SNF social service departments primarily help residents with admission, care and discharge planning, and adjusting to living in the SNF, social services also includes assuring that residents receive all the care they need (CMS, 2016b; 2013) . This implies that social services may influence multiple aspects of SNF quality, including quality of care, quality of life, resident rights, and the administration of the SNF. To examine both broad and specific aspects of SNF quality that are potentially influenced by social service departments, we require quality metrics that measure these various aspects of life in a SNF. To accomplish this, we study deficiency scores that measure overall, as well as more narrowly focused areas of quality.
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Deficiency scores are measures of SNF quality that result from the recertification survey process. As noted earlier, during recertification a survey team inspects each SNF and determines if the facility is meeting federal regulatory standards. When these standards are not met, the survey team will issue a deficiency with each specific regulatory standard identified by a number called an F-tag (Appendix Table   A4 ). To account for how serious each violation is, surveyors also assign a letter grade from "A" to "L" which corresponds to the severity and scope of the deficiency (Appendix Table A5 ). The severity of a deficiency citation measures the potential for harm to the health and safety of residents, whereas scope measures how widespread the violation is across the facility. Each letter grade corresponds to a point weighting, with more severe and wider scoped deficiencies receiving more points (CMS 2016a, pp. 3-16 The literature on the relationship between nurse staffing levels and quality is mixed. Bowblis (2011) and Lin (2014) find higher nurse staffing levels is associated with higher quality. In contrast, two studied examined the impact of legislative changes which enacted new or more stringent nurse staffing regulations (Matsudaira, 2014; Bowblis and Ghattas, 2017) . These studies found no significant relationships between increased nurse staffing levels and quality. 17 Direct care nurses include registered nurses without administrative duties, licensed practical nurses, and certified nurse aides. 18 Appendix Table A4 lists the different categories of nursing home regulations and their associated F-tags.
5).
19 A deficiency score is the sum of the number of points for each individual deficiency and higher values of a deficiency score indicates worse quality.
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If licensing improves quality, we would expect to see a reduction in these deficiency scores corresponding to the substitution of paraprofessionals for QSWs that occurs at the 121-bed threshold. The results of our regression discontinuity approach are reported visually in Figure 4 , while Table 4 documents the corresponding regression estimates. All visuals continue to show residuals from a regression with indicators for the state the facility is located in. We begin by considering broad, overall quality metrics and then move to the narrower aspects of quality that social service staff are more likely to influence.
At the broadest level, there are over 15 different regulations that correspond to over 170 specific regulatory standards or F-tags (CMS, 2016b) . To capture the overall quality in a SNF, we calculate a total deficiency score that includes all possible regulatory standards (Panel/Column 1). Our results show no apparent visual discontinuity at the 121-bed threshold; this is reflected in coefficient estimates which are statistically insignificant and change sign across different bandwidths. However, social services are just one input and any change in quality due to substituting paraprofessionals with QSWs could be dampened when examining deficiencies across all dimensions of quality. Because social service staff do not provide direct care to residents, better-staffed social service departments may be more likely to impact quality of life than quality of care. Using the States Operation Manual (CMS, 2016b), we identified regulations and their corresponding F-tags that CMS broadly classifies as quality of life. 21 The results for the quality of life deficiency score is reported in Panel/Column 2 and there is no statistically significant change in this quality, though the point estimates are uniformly negative -indicating a statistically insignificant improvement.
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To probe further, we examine narrower classifications within quality of life that are most likely to be influenced by the quality of social service department staffing -(3) "Resident Rights" ( §483.10) and (4) "Admission, Transfer, and Discharge Rights" ( §483.12). 23 Since social service staff are integral in 19 Appendix Table A5 documents how scope and severity map to deficiency points. 20 It should be noted that CMS assigns additional points for each time an inspection team must "revisit" the facility due to ongoing quality concerns, called noncompliance points. We do not include noncompliance points in our deficiency scores. 21 Quality of life deficiencies include F-tags 150-258 and 454-469. Quality of care deficiencies include F-tags 271-445. 22 Conducting the analogous analysis on deficiencies related to quality of care-an area outside of the direct influence of social services staff-yields both visual and regression evidence that suggest there is no impact on quality of care. 23 As defined under CMS (2016), "Resident rights" includes the ability of the resident to be informed of their rights, participate in care planning, voice and receive facility responses to grievances, and have social interactions. "Admission, Transfer, and Discharge Rights" are regulations related to being admitted, discharged to the transitioning into and out of a SNF, as well as develop care and discharge plans 2013; Vourlekis, Zlotnik, and Simons, 2005) , we would expect the efficacy of QSWs to show up in these two regulatory areas. We find no evidence that the OBRA-87 social service staffing provision had any impact on resident rights (Panel/Column 3). In the case of "Admission, Transfer, and Discharge Rights"
we find negative coefficient estimates indicating better quality and there is a statistically significant effect in one of the three bandwidths (Panel/Column 4). This could be anomalous, or could indicate that QSWs improve quality in this area. Given the lack of a clear visual discontinuity combined with the lack of statistical significance under alternative bandwidths, the balance of evidence suggests no major effect.
The most narrow and direct way to measure the quality of social services provided is by focusing on the regulatory standard §483.15(g)(1), which was noted in Section 2 and requires all SNFs to "provide medically-related social services to attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being of each resident." The effect of the 121-bed threshold on this specific deficiency, which we entitle "Provision of Social Services" and corresponds to F-tag 250, is presented in Panel/Column 5. There is no visual or statistically significant discontinuity in this measure. Moreover, the point estimates are all positive, strongly suggesting no reduction in the number of deficiency points related to this specific deficiency. The balance of evidence strongly suggests that increased use of QSWs in response to the OBRA-87 social service staffing provision does not improve quality. The only potential exception is in the area of Admission, Transfer, and Discharge Rights.
Finally, Panel/Column 6 illustrates proof of concept, highlighting what a clear discontinuity in a deficiency score would look like with our data. As noted in Section 2, a SNF will receive a deficiency under F-tag 251 if they do not adhere to the social service staffing provision from OBRA-87 ( §483.15(g) (2)). This deficiency should only be marked if the facility has at least 121 beds and it does not employ at least 1 FTE QSW. Notably, there is a clear jump in that deficiency score above the threshold. This is reassuring because, in theory, a SNF cannot receive the deficiency below the threshold. Further, it provides suggestive evidence that deficiency scores do an adequate job of measuring the intended outcome. If a true effect did exist, the deficiency score would exhibit a clear discontinuity at the threshold, as it does here.
Conclusion
As the practice of occupational licensing continues to grow, it becomes increasingly important to understand the associated welfare effects. Several studies provide evidence that licensing increases wages of licensed workers relative to their unlicensed counterparts (Kleiner and Krueger 2010; Kleiner and community, or transferred to another facility. This includes providing proper orientation and providing equal access to care by not having a differential admission policy by payer.
Krueger 2013). However, the impact of licensure on consumers is less clear. Advocates argue that licensure, through increased training and vetting, can improve safety and public health. Existing empirical evidence is mixed, with some studies suggesting quality improvements (Anderson et al., 2016) and others suggesting no quality impact (Kleiner and Kudrle, 2000) .
We contribute to the debate by estimating the impact of using licensed social workers in skilled nursing facilities (i.e. nursing homes) relative to using unlicensed paraprofessionals. Given that licensing usually occurs at the state level (House, 2015) , the use of licensed and unlicensed employees doing the same job in the same geographic area is rare. The presence of both types of employees providing social services at SNFs provides a clean framework to estimate the marginal improvement in quality associated with using a licensed worker relative to an unlicensed counterpart.
To isolate plausibly exogenous variation in the relative staffing of licensed versus unlicensed employees, we exploit a regulatory requirement from the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1987. The regulation requires all SNFs with more than 120 beds to employ at least one full-time equivalent qualified social worker. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that the provision binds at the margin for a significant share of SNFs. The share of social service staff composed of QSWs increases by 5-7 percentage points with no corresponding increase in social service staffing levels.
Therefore, our empirical strategy identifies the impact of requiring a social service department to be comprised of a more licensed staff, but cannot say anything about the overall level of social service staffing. Except in one specification, we find no evidence that the increase in licensure improves overall facility quality, quality of life, or the provision of social services.
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These results should be interpreted in context, as a recent U.S. government report highlights the breadth of occupations that are currently licensed (House, 2015) . 25 What is true for social workers may not be true for other occupations. Notably, SNFs are in a highly regulated industry where nurses and other types of staff with licenses are required to be present. Even though a SNF may solely employ unlicensed paraprofessionals, the presence of other licensed professionals and the fact that SNFs still face regulatory requirements to provide adequate social services may dampen the effect of licensure of social workers when examining broad quality measures. While further work is needed to examine if social workers impact areas of quality that are more difficult to measure, 26 our results are consistent with the view that using QSWs instead of paraprofessionals does not broadly improve quality in SNFs. In occupations where quality is not already regulated, licensing may be more effective. (CMS, 2016b) . These 15 regulatory areas can be broadly classified as related to quality of life, quality of care, and other areas (Harrington et al., 2000) . While the area each regulation addresses has not changed over the study period, the corresponding F-tags and how they are interpreted have changed from 1998 to 2016. The corresponding F-tags reported correspond to those codified at the start of 2016. Each deficiency is assigned a severity and scope which results in a corresponding letter assignment. This letter assignment corresponds to a number of points used by CMS to determine the number of stars a NH receives on Nursing Home Compare. For severity and scope combinations with two set of points, the higher point weighting is utilized if the deficiency falls under one of the following regulations: §483.13 resident behavior and nursing home practices, §483.15 quality of life, or §483.25 quality of care. All other deficiencies are weighted by the lower point amount. Source: CMS (2016a) 
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